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The diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development between advanced and developing countries
are pronounced. It has been observed, both theoretically and empirically, that these
diﬀerences in countries’ ﬁnancial systems are a source of comparative advantage and
trade. This paper points out that to the extent a country’s ﬁnancial development is
endogenous, it will in turn be inﬂuenced by trade. We build a model in which a country’s
ﬁnancial development is an equilibrium outcome of the economy’s productive structure:
in countries with large ﬁnancially intensive sectors ﬁnancial systems are more developed.
When a wealthy and a poor country open to trade, the ﬁnancially dependent sectors
grow in the wealthy country, and so does the ﬁnancial system. By contrast, as the
ﬁnancially intensive sectors shrink in the poor country, demand for external ﬁnance
decreases and the domestic ﬁnancial system deteriorates. We test our model using data
on ﬁnancial development for a sample of 77 countries. We ﬁnd that the main predictions
of the model are borne out in the data: trade openness is associated with faster ﬁnancial
development in wealthier countries, and with slower ﬁnancial development in poorer
ones.
∗We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Abhijit Banerjee, Thorsten Beck, Olivier Blanchard, Simon John-
son, Roberto Rigobon, and workshop participants at MIT for helpful comments. The ﬁndings, interpre-
tations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessar-


















































































































d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development across countries. In 1995, the
average ratio of private credit to GDP was 0.95 in OECD countries, and just 0.3 in devel-
oping countries (see Figure 1). At the same time, a signiﬁcant and growing share of world’s
GDP is now exported and imported across country borders (Maddison, 2001). Do these
two broad features of today’s world economy interact in important ways?
When industries diﬀer in their reliance on external ﬁnance, in the sense of, for example,
Rajan and Zingales (1998), these diﬀerences would be expected to interact with cross-
country variation in ﬁnancial development to serve as a source of comparative advantage and
trade. The notion of ﬁnancial comparative advantage has been formalized theoretically by
Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) and Baldwin (1989). The key insight is that countries endowed
with better ﬁnancial systems will produce and export ﬁnancially dependent goods. Indeed,
there is some recent empirical evidence that ﬁnancial comparative advantage is relevant to
trade patterns, e.g. Beck (2002, 2003), Becker and Greenberg (2003), Svaleryd and Vlachos
(2004).
The framework in which diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development are an exogenous determi-
nant of trade is only appropriate if we believe that a country’s ﬁnancial system is exogenously
given. One may take this view, for instance, in light of the strand of literature originated
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), which provides evidence that
ﬁnancial development is determined in part by the type of legal system an economy adopted
at some point in its history. A country’s historical experience is clearly important. How-
ever, even within each legal system, countries diﬀer a great deal in their degree of ﬁnancial
development. Along these lines, Rajan and Zingales (2003) document considerable varia-
tion in ﬁnancial development over the past century, providing evidence that the historically
inherited legal system is only one of many determinants of ﬁnancial development. To the
extent a country’s ﬁnancial system is endogenous, we would expect it to be inﬂuenced by
the economic conditions a country faces, and that includes trade.
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of international trade on ﬁnancial development. We build
a model with two sectors, one of which is ﬁnancially intensive. The size of the ﬁnancial
system, that is, the amount of borrowing and lending that occurs in the economy, is naturally
a function of total output in the ﬁnancially intensive sector. Furthermore, the quality of
the ﬁnancial system is a function of its size. In our framework, a larger ﬁnancial sector
leads to the greater ease with which entrepreneurs are able to fulﬁll the need for external
ﬁnance. This is because when entrepreneurs start ﬁnancially intensive projects and engage
2the country’s ﬁnancial system, they add liquidity. A deeper ﬁnancial system makes projects
less risky by reducing the number of states in which liquidity is lacking. Entrepreneurs
that enter the ﬁnancially dependent sector thus exert a positive externality on the other
entrepreneurs.
We ﬁnd plausible the positive feedback from the size of the ﬁnancial system to its qual-
ity. Levine and Schmukler (2003) document that when some ﬁrms in emerging markets
begin raising external ﬁnance abroad rather than at home, trading liquidity of the remain-
ing domestic ﬁrms actually decreases, providing evidence that ﬁnancial depth is positively
related to market size. Furthermore, this type of eﬀect is implicit is most studies of ﬁnancial
development quoted above. These studies typically use measures of ﬁnancial system size,
such as ratios of private credit to GDP or stock market capitalization to GDP, to proxy for
ﬁnancial system quality.
O p e n i n gt ot r a d ew i l la ﬀect demand for external ﬁnance, and thus ﬁnancial depth, in the
trading countries. In particular, when a wealthy country starts trading with a poor one, it
will naturally increase production of the ﬁnancially dependent good, and its ﬁnancial system
will deepen. In the poor country, on the other hand, the ﬁnancially dependent sector will
shrink, leading to a deterioration in the size of the country’s ﬁnancial system, as well as its
quality.
The bottom line is that when a poor country no longer needs to produce the ﬁnancially
dependent good, demand for external ﬁnance will decrease as a result of trade, and the
domestic ﬁnancial system will suﬀer. This could induce losses from trade to the poor
country, as could be expected given that the ﬁnancially dependent industry exhibits external
eﬀects, and thus economy-wide increasing returns to scale (see Helpman and Krugman,
1985, ch. 3). Furthermore, the deterioration of the domestic ﬁnancial system could be
harmful to the poor country for reasons beyond gains from trade. Indeed, there is a great
deal of empirical evidence that ﬁnancial development is conducive to increasing growth and
lowering volatility (Levine, 2003, Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003).
In illustrating the eﬀect of trade on the ﬁnancial system, we make a series of special
assumptions. First, in modeling the market for external ﬁn a n c ea n dt h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of
ﬁnancial system size on its quality, we abstract from the informational and enforcement
frictions that are often invoked in this context. One can clearly adopt this approach as well,
and think of the quality of the ﬁnancial system in terms of how well it can overcome these
distortions and achieve the eﬃcient level of lending. A positive link between the size of the
ﬁnancial markets and their ability to resolve such frictions has been modeled, for example,
3by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999).
On a related point, in our model countries will diﬀer only in their levels of wealth, and
wealth levels will determine the direction of ﬁnancial comparative advantage. Diﬀerences
in institutional quality, such as enforcement of contracts and property rights, are clearly
important in driving the pattern of ﬁnancial comparative advantage. Adding institutional
diﬀerences to our framework will leave the main conclusions unchanged, and in fact reinforce
the strength of ﬁnancial comparative advantage as long as wealthier countries are also the
ones with better institutions.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tt h ee ﬀect of trade opening on ﬁnancial development we
illustrate here is one of many that could be relevant in practice. For instance, trade can
increase uncertainty and income variability of agents within the economy (Newbery and
Stiglitz, 1984). Financial system could then be expected to grow after trade opening, as
agents’ demand for insurance increases.1 This type of mechanism is not inconsistent with the
eﬀect we are proposing. One important diﬀerence, however, is that our mechanism aﬀects
countries diﬀerentially, while the alternative one unambiguously implies an improvement of
the ﬁnancial system in all countries.
The model predicts that in wealthy countries, trade should be associated with faster
ﬁnancial development. By contrast, in poor countries, more trade should lead to slower
ﬁnancial development, as these countries import ﬁnancially intensive goods rather than
develop their own ﬁnancial system. We use data on ﬁnancial development for a sample of
77 countries compiled by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) to show that the pattern
predicted by the model seems to ﬁnd empirical support. While for developed countries,
higher trade openness is associated with faster growth of the ﬁnancial system, developing
countries that traded more experienced slower growth in their ﬁnancial systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
shows that when the amount of lending and the quality of the ﬁnancial system are equi-
librium outcomes, they will be inﬂuenced by trade. Section 3 discusses empirical evidence.
Section 4 concludes.
1Rodrik (1998) shows that more open countries have larger governments, which helps them deal with
increased uncertainty that is associated with openness. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) provide empirical
evidence that countries with better developed ﬁnancial systems are more likely to be open to trade, and
argue this is because a better ﬁnancial system allows a country to better cope with increased uncertainty.
Tangentially, these authors also provide some evidence that the ﬁnancial system improves after trade opening.
42 The Model
2.1 The Environment
Consider an economy with 3 goods and 2 factors, labor (entrepreneurs) and wealth. There
is a ﬁnal consumption good, and agents’ utility is assumed to be linear this good. The ﬁnal
good will serve as the numeraire, and we normalize its price to 1. The time horizon consists
of the interval t ∈ [0,1].A tt =1 ,t h eﬁnal good is produced with two intermediate goods




If prices of intermediate goods are denoted by p1 and p2,p r o ﬁt maximization in the ﬁnal













Intermediate good 1 is ﬁnancially intensive, while intermediate good 2 does not rely on
external ﬁnance. Entrepreneurs make the decision to enter either of the two intermediate
goods sectors at t =0 . Production in the two sectors then occurs continuously in the
interval t ∈ [0,1].
In particular, setting up a unit of production of intermediate good 2 requires no wealth
and one unit of labor/entrepreneur. The project then produces a constant ﬂow return Rdt,




Setting up a production unit of intermediate good 1 requires one entrepreneur and C
units of wealth. Each entrepreneur then manages a ﬂow of projects between dates t =0
and t =1 . Between time t and t + dt, entrepreneurs face a liquidity shock ˜ Ltdt. At each
date, we assume that Lt = −L with probability 1
2 and Lt = L with probability 1
2. Shocks
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, and cannot be saved.
If the liquidity shock is positive, or the liquidity need is fulﬁlled, then the project yields
a ﬂow of returns Rdt; otherwise it returns 0 (see Figure 2). Denoting by Ri
tdt the realized







5Agents with a negative liquidity shock can borrow from those with a positive one at each
t ∈ [0,1].L e trt denote the gross interest rate which prevails at time t; a debt contracted
at time t is a claim on time t =1returns and rt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0,1]. How can we determine the
total ﬂow of production and the interest rate at each time t? Let there be η entrepreneurs






Entrepreneurs with excess liquidity lend to entrepreneurs with liquidity shortages at the
instantaneous interest rate rt. In case of a positive aggregate liquidity shock (Λt ≥ 0),
interest rate drops to zero and no projects are liquidated. If a negative aggregate shock hits
the economy at time t, then a fraction γt of projects are liquidated and interest rates rise
so that lenders appropriate all surplus: rtLdt = p1Rdt. The aggregate production ﬂow is
then given by
K1t = ηR(1 − γt)dt,
and the aggregate production realized at t =1is:
K1 = ηR[1 − γ (η)],
where γ (η) ≡
R 1
0 γtdt.
We can think of the equilibrium value of γ(η) as capturing the quality of the ﬁnancial
system. It reﬂects the fraction of time an agent is unable to fulﬁll the need for external
ﬁnance. In this setting, γ(η) is a function of the number of entrepreneurs that access the
ﬁnancial system. The ﬁnancial system beneﬁts from having more entrepreneurs.
We now see that production in this sector is characterized by a positive externality. Each
agent’s decision to enter provides a beneﬁt to the other agents, by reducing the number of
states in which aggregate liquidity is lacking. But since in states with positive aggregate
liquidity each agent borrows or lends at rate rt =0 , the agent does not internalize the
positive eﬀect she has on everyone else when making the entry decision. It is helpful to
state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: The structure of liquidity externalities
With η entrepreneurs in sector 1, aggregate supply of intermediate good 1 is given by
K1 = ηR[1 − γ (η)], (2)
where γ (η) is a decreasing and convex function of η such that limη→0 γ (η)=1
2 and
limη→∞ γ (η)=0 .
6Proof: see Appendix.
2.2 Closed Economy Equilibrium
We can now analyze the equilibrium in the closed economy. Suppose that a country’s
endowment of entrepreneurs is normalized to 1, and the total wealth in the economy is W.
We assume that the opportunity cost of wealth outside of production of intermediate good
1i sz e r o . 2 Thus, there are two possibilities: if production in sector 1 requires the entire
wealth in the economy, r>0. If, on the other hand, sector 1 production uses less than the
total wealth in equilibrium, r =0 .
At t =0 , agents make entry choices. The return earned by an entrepreneur in sector
2i sV2 = p2R. To enter sector 1, the entrepreneur must borrow C units of wealth at the
prevailing interest rate r. Then, the value of the project is:
V1 (η)=p1R[1 − γ (η)] − rC.
In equilibrium, the entrepreneur project choice arbitrage condition must be satisﬁed: V1 (η)=
V2.
When η entrepreneurs enter sector 1 in equilibrium, total production in sector 1 is given
by (2), and in sector 2 by
K2 =( 1− η)R. (3)
We can now state the equilibrium conditions in this economy:
Proposition 1 : Equilibrium in the closed economy
The equilibrium of the economy is characterized by a vector of prices (p1,p 2,r) and a
fraction η of entrepreneurs in sector 1, such that the following conditions hold:




η [1 − γ (η)]
¸1−α
, (4)
p2 =( 1 − α)A
·




2. Project choice arbitrage condition:
p1R[1 − γ (η)] − rC = p2R; (6)
2Alternatively, we could assume a lower bound on r that is higher than zero, which we could think of as
a storage technology. None of the results would change, and the analysis would be identical as long as we
d i dn o ta l l o ws t o r e dw e a l t ht of u l ﬁll a liquidity need at t ∈ (0,1).
73. Time t =0credit market clearing conditions:
ηC ≤ W,
and
ηC < W ⇒ r =0 .
Corollary 1: In autarky, it must be that:
r =0⇒ η = α.
Proof: see Appendix.
We can then determine the equilibrium industrial structure of the country, which fully
characterizes the economy.
Corollary 2: In a closed economy, the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs who un-
dertake the risky project is given by







Thus, in this economy there are two kinds of equilibria, depending on the value of the
parameters and wealth endowment W. Either the economy is not wealth constrained, and
the share of entrepreneurs going to sector 1 is α, the value that would be unchanged even if
wealth was inﬁnite. Or the economy produces the highest quantity of intermediate 1 that
its wealth would allow.
2.2.1 The Social Planner Solution
It may be instructive to set up the social planner’s problem, and show that in the decentral-
ized equilibrium the size of sector 1 is too low. A social planner would maximize aggregate
output. She would choose the number of entrepreneurs ηSP to work in sector 1 to maximize:
ηSP =a r g m a x
η∈(0,1)
AR{η[1 − γ (η)]}










1 − γ (ηSP)
=
1 − α
1 − ηSP . (7)
8Given that in the decentralized equilibrium, ηDC = α, and thus α
ηDC = 1−α
1−ηDC,t h es o c i a l
planner’s solution is not the same as that occurring in the decentralized equilibrium. In
particular, since a larger ﬁnancial sector implies that fewer projects are liquidated, the term
−α
γ0(ηSP)
1−γ(ηSP) > 0. This in turn implies that ηSP >α= ηDC: the social planner solution
has a larger ﬁnancially intensive sector. This is because when entrepreneurs enter sector 1,
they do not internalize the beneﬁt they provide to all the other entrepreneurs through the
improved ﬁnancial system.
What about when the economy is wealth-constrained? Since the economy reaches the
maximum attainable level of the ﬁnancially intensive sector production, the social planner
cannot improve upon the decentralized allocation, and thus the social planner solution
coincides with the market equilibrium. We can calculate the marginal welfare gain from
giving a wealth-constrained country one extra unit of wealth. In such a situation, an
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1−γ(η). A wealth-constrained country is not only subject to misallocation of tasks be-
cause it cannot implement the optimal number of projects of type 1, but is also subject to
larger aggregate liquidity shocks that lower the return on each ﬁnancially intensive project
undertaken.
2.3 Trade Equilibrium
Suppose that there are two countries, North (N) and South (S). While the ﬁnal consump-
tion good is non-tradeable, intermediates 1 and 2 can be traded at no cost. Suppose for
simplicity that both countries are endowed with one unit of labor, but that their wealth
levels diﬀer. I particular, suppose that WN >W S.T oﬁx ideas, we will also assume that
WN ≥ αC ≥ WS: in autarky, the North is wealthy, while the South is wealth-constrained.
The diﬀerence in wealth endowments will drive the pattern of comparative advantage.
While both countries possess the same technology, the North will specialize in the production
of the ﬁnancially intensive intermediate.3 This is intuitive: to serve the world market of
3We could introduce the North’s ﬁnancial comparative advantage in other ways. For instance, we could
9intermediate 1 would require a country to expand its production of that good vis-a-vis
autarky. Since the South is wealth-constrained, it cannot do so, while the North can. We
now state the equilibrium conditions under trade.
Proposition 2: Equilibrium with Trade
The trade equilibrium is characterized by a vector of prices (p1,p 2,r N,r S),w h e r e(rN,r S)
are time t =0interest rates in the North and the South, and (ηN,ηS), the number of entre-
preneurs undertaking risky projects in each country, that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Intermediate good market clearing conditions:
p1 = αA
·
(1 − ηN)+( 1− ηS)
ηN [1 − γ (ηN)] + ηS [1 − γ (ηS)]
¸1−α
, (8)
p2 =( 1 − α)A
·
ηN [1 − γ (ηN)] + ηS [1 − γ (ηS)]
(1 − ηN)+( 1− ηS)
¸α
; (9)
2. Project choice arbitrage condition for j = N,S:







− rjC = p2R; (10)
ii) if in the North only sector 1 is open:
p1R[1 − γ (1)] − rNC ≥ p2R; (11)
iii) if in the South only sector 2 is open:
p1R[1 − γ (0)] ≤ p2R; (12)
3. Time t =0credit markets clearing condition for j = N,S:
ηjC ≤ Wj,
and
ηjC<W j ⇒ rj =0 .
The pattern of production and trade can be determined from the equilibrium conditions.
The key result for us is that the North expands production of the ﬁnancially intensive good
assume that the North has better institutions, which allow it to achieve greater eﬃciency in the market for
external ﬁnance. The quality of institutions is undoubtedly important, but for our purposes this alternative
modeling approach will yield similar results.
10(ηN increases compared to autarky), while in the South, the ﬁnancially intensive sector
contracts (ηS falls, possibly to zero). Thus, the size of the ﬁnancial system, that is, the
amount of borrowing and lending that occurs in the economy, increases in the North and
decreases in the South.
This is not without consequence for the quality of the ﬁnancial system, given here by
γ(η). In particular, as ηN increases, γ(ηN) goes up as well. This means that the agents
operating in sector 1 in the North are able to fulﬁll their external ﬁnancing needs more
often, lowering the fraction of periods during which they lose output due to unsatisﬁed
liquidity needs.
In the South, as the share of agents employed in the ﬁnancial sector contracts, production
in the sector 1 experiences more periods in which some agents’ external ﬁnancing needs are
not satisﬁed. Thus, the quality of the ﬁnancial system deteriorates. For some parameter
values, sector 1 disappears from the South entirely. This this case, an entrepreneur wishing
to enter the sector experiences the most diﬃcult conditions, with γ at its highest value of
γ(0).
2.3.1 Gains from Trade
While the main purpose of the model we present here is to show that the ﬁnancial outcomes
— the size of the ﬁnancial sector and its quality — are aﬀected by trade, it may also be useful
to analyze aggregate welfare implications of trade. We show that under some conditions,
the South may lose from trade. The key insight is that when production is characterized
by externalities, one of the countries may lose as a result of trade. When the sector which
exhibits the externality shrinks, the remaining ﬁrms experience a de facto productivity
decrease, and this eﬀect can more than oﬀset traditional comparative-advantage based gains.
The mechanism is well known (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985, ch. 3).
Since we’ve assumed that utility is linear in the consumption of the ﬁnal good, and set
its price as the numeraire, aggregate welfare in these economies is proportional to the real
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11Correspondingly, if trade prices are given by pT
1 and pT










2 (1 − ηT
N)










2 (1 − ηT
S)
in the South, keeping in mind that ηT
N may be 1 and ηT
S may be 0: only one sector could
be operating in some countries under trade.





S . We can see that in the North there are standard comparative advantage-
driven gains that come from reallocating resources to sector 1. Furthermore, as sector 1
grows in the North, the de facto productivity of Northern ﬁr m si nt h i ss e c t o rg r o w sa sw e l l ,
1 − γ(ηT
N) > 1 − γ(ηaut
N ). Thus, the North experiences additional gains. As the size of the
ﬁnancial sector grows, the ﬁnancial system improves, and thus less output is lost due to
unfulﬁlled need for external ﬁnance.
In the South, we see that the standard comparative advantage-driven gains are oﬀset
by the deterioration of the ﬁnancial system, and the resulting drop in productivity in the
ﬁnancially intensive sector. As the ﬁnancial system shrinks, there are more and more unﬁlled
needs for external ﬁnance, and thus the ﬁrms operating (or considering operating) in that
sector face a low productivity. This lowers the opportunity cost of labor in the South, and
thus in some cases may even imply that the real price of intermediate 2, to which labor is
reallocated after trade, is lower under trade than in autarky. In the Appendix, we provide
a proof that the South may on aggregate lose from trade.
2.4 Equilibrium with Factor Mobility
The best decentralized equilibrium outcome is achieved in this model when factors are
mobile. We state the equilibrium conditions here.
Proposition 3: Equilibrium in the integrated economy
The equilibrium of the integrated economy is characterized by a vector of prices (p1,p 2,r)
and the number η of entrepreneurs investing in the risky project in the two countries com-
bined, such that:




η [1 − γ (η)]
¸1−α
, (13)
p2 =( 1 − α)A
·




122. Project choice arbitrage condition:
p1R[1 − γ (η)] − rC = p2R; (15)
3. Time t =0credit market clearing conditions:
ηC ≤ (WN + WS),
and
ηC < (WN + WS) ⇒ r =0 .
We can make several observations about the integrated world and how it compares to the






which is weakly greater than the combined size of the ﬁnancial sector when the two countries
are in autarky, and is strictly greater if in autarky one of the countries is wealth-constrained.
Also, while the South may lose on aggregate in the trade equilibrium, it is clear that in
the fully integrated equilibrium the South gains with certainty. This is because Southern
entrepreneurs are able to enter the ﬁnancially intensive sector which has access to the
worldwide ﬁnancial markets.
Though the integrated economy equilibrium is still suboptimal, it is nevertheless worth
noticing through equation (7) that the market failure, measured by the term −α
γ0(η)
1−γ(η)
is smaller as η gets larger. When wealth can move costlessly between the two countries,
liquidity shocks that hit entrepreneurs are averaged out at the world level, which decreases
the likelihood of a negative aggregate shock occurring. The poorer country beneﬁts more
from integration than the richer country.
3 Empirical Evidence
The model presented in the section above illustrates the main point of the paper: to the
extent both the size and the quality of a country’s ﬁnancial system are equilibrium outcomes
of local demand and supply for external ﬁnance, they will be inﬂuenced by trade. Thus,
the impact of trade is expected to be diﬀerential across countries. When trade leads to
specialization in ﬁnancially dependent goods, it will lead to growth of the ﬁnancial system.
Conversely, when trade leads a country to import the ﬁnancially dependent goods rather
13than produce them domestically, the ﬁnancial system will shrink after trade opening, ceteris
paribus.
We test the predictions of our model using a dataset compiled by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
and Levine (2000). It consists of measures of ﬁnancial development plus a variety of other
country-level variables, including trade openness, for 22 OECD countries and 55 developing
countries. The dataset is also available as a panel, reporting data at 5-year intervals from
1965 to 1995. The list of countries is presented in Table 1.
The key question is how do we proxy for ﬁnancial comparative advantage: which coun-
tries should we expect to export ﬁnancially dependent goods? The model gives the answer
in terms of per capita income: a richer country will specialize in the ﬁnancially intensive
good. Perhaps at least as relevant empirically is the quality of institutions dimension: coun-
tries with better enforcement of contracts and property rights will be expected to export
the ﬁnancially dependent good under trade. In practice, of course, institutional quality and
per capita incomes are extremely highly correlated (ρ ≈ 0.85), and thus the two sources
of ﬁnancial comparative advantage will tend to reinforce each other. Thus, in the present
empirical work we will take per capita incomes as a suﬃcient statistic for the degree of
ﬁnancial comparative advantage.
Thus, we attempt to show that trade led to faster ﬁnancial development in richer coun-
tries, and slower ﬁnancial development in poorer countries. As a ﬁrst pass, we split the
sample into OECD and non-OECD countries,4 and run the following basic speciﬁcation in
the two subsamples:
FinDevj = α + β ∗ Trade65j + δ ∗ Xj + εj, (16)
where FinDevj is the change in country j’s ﬁnancial development over the period 1965-
95, Trade65j is a country’s trade openness in 1965 and Xj is a set of controls. Financial
development is measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP, while trade openness is
measured by (Exports+Imports)/GDP. The list of controls includes initial level of private
credit to GDP, initial per capita GDP, a measure of human capital (average years of sec-
ondary schooling in the population), as well as legal origin dummies. Variable deﬁnitions
and summary statistics are presented in Table 2.
The results are presented in Table 3. Column 1 estimates equation (16) for the OECD
countries. In developed countries, trade openness has if anything a positive eﬀect on sub-
4As expected, the diﬀerences in per capita income across these two groups are pronounced. In the OECD
sample, per capita GDP is $7354, while in the other sample, $1010.
14sequent ﬁnancial development, though it is not statistically signiﬁcant.5 T h ef a c tt h a tt h e
positive eﬀect of trade on ﬁnancial development is not strong in the OECD sample is not
surprising, as a large share of OECD trade is with other OECD countries, and the ﬁnan-
cial comparative advantage is not likely to be especially important in this trade relative to
other determinants, such as increasing returns. By contrast, in developing countries trade
openness has a negative eﬀect. Column 2 replicates the regression from Column 1 in the
non-OECD sample. The coeﬃcient on the trade variable is negative and signiﬁcant, with a
p-value of 8%.
The key eﬀect that our model illustrates is that trade aﬀects ﬁnancial development
diﬀerently depending on how strong are the forces of ﬁnancial comparative advantage, as
proxied by per capita income. Thus, we augment the basic speciﬁcation by including an
interaction term between trade and per capita GDP:
FinDevj = α + β1 ∗ Trade65j + β2 ∗ Trade65j ∗ Income65j + δ ∗ Xj + εj, (17)
This allows us to pool the sample and test for the diﬀerential impact of trade. While
n o ww ea r ea g n o s t i ca b o u tt h es i g no ft h em a i ne ﬀect of trade, β1, we are interested in
whether the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, β2, is positive and signiﬁcant. Column 3
presents the results of estimating equation (17). To ease interpretation of the interaction
coeﬃcient, all variables have been demeaned. The main eﬀect of trade openness on ﬁnancial
development is positive but not signiﬁcant in the full sample. The trade-income interaction
term, by contrast, is positive and signiﬁcant at 1% level. Column 4 presents a speciﬁcation
that includes a full set of GDP interaction terms, allowing the eﬀect of other regressors
on ﬁnancial development to be aﬀected diﬀerentially for rich and poor countries. The
coeﬃcients of interest are virtually unchanged in the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation.
The results show that trade aﬀects ﬁnancial development diﬀerentially based on a coun-
try’s level of income. In particular, for a country at the mean of the per capita GDP
distribution, the eﬀect of trade on ﬁnancial development is given by the coeﬃcient on the
main trade term, slightly positive in this sample, though not statistically diﬀerent from
zero at 0.3. A country which is in the 25th percentile of per capita income distribution is
aﬀected by trade negatively, with the derivative of ﬁnancial development with respect to
trade being -0.2. In a country in the 10th percentile of the per capita income distribution,
that negative eﬀect has magnitude of -0.7. By contrast, in a country that is in the 75th
5The coeﬃcient in the OECD sample is not signiﬁcant, however, if outlier Japan is dropped from the
sample, the coeﬃcient increases by a factor of more than 1.5 and becomes signiﬁcant at 2% level. Japan is
indeed an exception, as it is relatively closed but experienced a very strong ﬁnancial sector expansion in the
last 30 years.
15percentile of the income distribution, the eﬀect of trade on ﬁnancial development is positive,
with the derivative being 0.96.
While the Ordinary Least Squares estimates suggest that the correlations present in the
data support the main argument we are making in this paper, they do not let us argue that
the relationship between trade openness and the pace of ﬁnancial development is indeed
causal. We can address this issue by instrumenting for trade openness with a variable
that does not directly aﬀect ﬁnancial development. Such a variable was constructed by
Frankel and Romer (1999). Using on the gravity model of trade, these authors construct
a predicted measure of trade openness based on geographical characteristics, such as land
area, population, and distance to other countries. This instrument for trade openness has
since been widely used in the literature.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 replicate the pooled sample speciﬁcations of Columns (3)
and (4), using as an instrument for trade openness the predicted trade openness constructed
by Frankel and Romer, and as an instrument for the trade-income interaction term the
interaction between the Frankel and Romer variable and income. The point estimates on
the coeﬃcients of interest are similar to the OLS coeﬃcients, and signiﬁcant.
To check the robustness of this result, it is important to establish that it is not driven
by outliers. In presenting robustness checks, we report the instrumental variables estimates
throughout. Using OLS estimates leaves all the conclusions unchanged, in fact the coef-
ﬁcients of interest are if anything more robust in the OLS estimation. Table 4 presents
the results of reestimating the basic speciﬁcation, ﬁrst dropping outliers on trade, then on
income. The two least open countries in the data set are United States and Japan. The
two most open countries are the Gambia and Guyana. Results of dropping these in turn
are presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. Though the signiﬁcance level deteriorates
somewhat, the point estimates are similar to the base speciﬁcation and remain signiﬁcant.
We then drop outliers on income. The wealthiest countries in our sample are United States
and Switzerland. The three poorest countries are Rwanda, India, and Pakistan.6 We present
the results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. We see that the results are not driven purely
by income outliers. The coeﬃcients change little and remain signiﬁcant.
As another robustness check, Table 5 presents estimation results when alternative in-
dicators of ﬁnancial development are used. We use two alternative measures, the ratio of
liquid liabilities (M2) to GDP, and claims of deposit money banks on nonﬁnancial domestic
6Since India and Pakistan’s per capita incomes are virtually identical, we drop both of them in this
robustness check.
16sectors as share of GDP. The former is broader than the main measure that we use, while
the latter is an indicator of banking ﬁnance in particular. Table 5 shows that the eﬀect we
are highlighting is not driven purely by our measure of ﬁnancial development. The coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction term of interest is signiﬁcant and reveals a similar eﬀect of trade
on these alternative measures of ﬁnancial system growth. The point estimates indicate,
however, that the eﬀect of trade on these indicators of ﬁnancial development is appreciably
negative only for countries in the bottom quartile of the income distribution.
We can also use the panel dimension of the data to shed light on this relationship. In
particular, we test whether ﬁnancial development over a ﬁve-year horizon is aﬀected by
trade openness in the beginning of the period:
FinDevjt = α + β1 ∗ Tradejt−1 + β2 ∗ Tradejt−1 ∗ Incomejt−1 + δ ∗ Xjt−1 + ηj + εjt,
where t = 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, and 1990-95. The speciﬁcation
includes a full set of country dummies, thus controlling for any country characteristics that
are not time-varying. The results are presented in Table 6. Unfortunately, we cannot use the
instrumental variables approach here, as the trade openness instrument is not time-varying,
and thus is perfectly correlated with the country ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 1 contains the base
speciﬁcation. The trade-income interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant, in parallel to
the cross-sectional regression. We establish that this eﬀect is not driven by our choice of
ﬁnancial development variable in Columns 2 and 3. The interaction of interest remains
signiﬁcant when we use alternative measures of ﬁnancial development. In the last column,
we include a full set of time dummies. We see that our results are not driven purely by
omitted time eﬀects, in fact the coeﬃcient of interest is virtually unchanged.
4C o n c l u s i o n
It has been documented that the diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development between developed
and developing countries are substantial, and that these diﬀerences are an important deter-
minant of trade patterns. Departing from the realization that ﬁnancial development aﬀects
trade patterns, this paper asks the opposite question: will openness to trade aﬀect countries’
ﬁnancial development?
We build a model in which each country’s ﬁnancial system is an endogenous outcome
of entrepreneurs’ demand for external ﬁnance. In this world, when a poor and a rich
country open to trade, the poorer country begins to import the ﬁnancially dependent good,
rather than produce it domestically. This in turn implies that demand for external ﬁnance
17decreases, and the domestic ﬁnancial system deteriorates. This eﬀect may or may not
generate losses from trade to the poor country, but the deterioration of the ﬁnancial system
may be important for a wide variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this model.
Indeed, the importance of ﬁnancial development to fostering long-run growth and reducing
output volatility has received a great deal of attention in the literature.
In the model we presented, the comparative advantage that generates the key eﬀect
comes purely from diﬀerences in wealth between countries. However, in practice institutional
quality — contract enforcement, property rights, investor protection, etc. — has been shown to
be quite important to ﬁnancial development (La Porta et al., 1997). Institutional diﬀerences
will tend to reinforce the ﬁnancial comparative advantage in favor of rich countries, and
exacerbate the eﬀects we highlight here.
We provide empirical evidence that trade openness aﬀects countries’ ﬁnancial systems
diﬀerentially. In richer countries trade promotes ﬁnancial system growth, in poorer ones
the eﬀect is the opposite. While the results in this paper are suggestive, there are a number
of important caveats. The empirical proxy of ﬁnancial development we use is the ratio of
total lending to GDP, which is a measure of the size of the ﬁnancial system and not its
quality. Thus, while the results are consistent with the model we presented in this paper,
they do not allow us to conclude that the quality of the ﬁnancial system is aﬀected as well
as its size.
The strength of ﬁnancial comparative advantage was proxied crudely by the interaction
of aggregate trade openness and per capita income. Perhaps the revealed ﬁnancial compar-
ative advantage can be measured more precisely by looking at industry-level import and
export data and the implied “ﬁnancial content of trade.” Implementing more sophisticated
empirical tests of the inﬂuence of trade on the ﬁnancial system remains on the research
agenda.
5A p p e n d i x 1
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18and it is easy to check that γ (1) = 1/2 and limη→∞ γ (η)=0 . Furthermore the sequences
{2η[γ (2η +2 )− γ (2η)]}η≥1 and {(2η − 1)[γ (2η +1 )− γ (2η − 1)]}η≥1 are positive and de-
creasing. In the rest of the paper, the notation γ0 (η) will refer to 1
2 [γ (2k +2 )− γ (2k)] if
η is of the form η =2 k for some k ≥ 1 and 1
2 [γ (2k +1 )− γ (2k − 1)] if η is of the form
η =2 k − 1 for some k ≥ 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1:
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Proof that the South may on aggregate lose from trade
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which will be true for small rS
A: the country is not too wealth-constrained in autarky.
This discussion is suggestive of the set of conditions under which the South is most
likely to lose from trade. When the South is not too wealth-constrained in autarky, and
still produces intermediate 1 under trade, the de facto productivity loss coming from the
deterioration of the ﬁnancial system is most severe. Note that this will happen if the North is
wealth-constrained under trade: there is not enough wealth in the North to accommodate
the entire world production of intermediate 1. This suggests that the South would gain
relatively more from opening to trade with a country that is much wealthier rather than
slightly more wealthy. Of course, the conditions for the South to lose from trade that are
stated here are not necessary.
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Figure 2: Timing of the risky project 
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Table 1: Country list 
OECD     non-OECD          
        
Australia*   Algeria   Malawi   
Austria*   Argentina*   Malaysia*   
Belgium*   Bolivia*   Mauritius*   
Canada*   Brazil*   Mexico*   
Denmark*   Cameroon   Nepal   
Finland*    Central African Republic Nicaragua   
France*   Chile*   Niger*   
Germany*   Colombia*   Pakistan*   
Greece*   Congo   Panama*   
Ireland*    Costa Rica*    Papua New Guinea 
Israel*   Cyprus   Paraguay*   
Italy*   Dominican  Republic*  Peru*   
Japan*   Ecuador*   Philippines* 
Netherlands*  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Rwanda*   
New Zealand*  El Salvador*    Senegal*   
Norway*   Gambia,  The*   Sierra  Leone 
Portugal*   Ghana*   South  Africa* 
Spain*   Guatemala*   Sri  Lanka*   
Sweden*   Guyana*   Sudan*   
Switzerland* Haiti*    Syria   
United Kingdom*  Honduras*    Thailand*   
United States*  India*    Togo   
  Indonesia   Trinidad  and  Tobago* 
    Iran, Islamic Republic of  Uruguay*   
  Jamaica*   Venezuela   
  Kenya*   Zaire   
  Korea,  Republic  of  Zimbabwe   
  Lesotho      
                 
* indicates countries included in the cross-sectional regression 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Name Definition  Mean St.  Dev. 
     
FinDev  Log growth in (Private 
Credit)/GDP, 1965-1995 
0.574196 0.6722497 
     
Trade65  (Imports+Exports)/GDP in 1965 0.5474669  0.4745315 
     
PrivateCredit65  Private Credit in 1965  0.3010849  0.2505624 
     
Income  Log of per capita GDP  7.468612  1.261692 
     
School  Average years of secondary 
schooling in total population 
0.8835088 0.7760051 
     
English  English legal origin    
     
French  French legal origin    
     
German  German legal origin    
           
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). 
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Table 3: Regression Results, Cross-Sectional Specification 
Dependent Variable: FinDev                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Trade65  0.47 -0.31 0.24 0.30 0.41 0.54 
  (0.40)  (0.17)*  (0.18) (0.21) (0.34) (0.41) 
Trade65*Income65      0.51 0.53 0.45 0.62 
      (0.18)***  (0.18)*** (0.27)* (0.23)*** 
PrivateCredit65  -0.99 -1.50 -1.06 -2.09 -1.09 -2.11 
  (0.34)**  (1.37)  (0.39)***  (0.74)*** (0.43)** (0.76)*** 
Income65  0.40 -0.27 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.08 
  (0.23) (0.20) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18) 
School65  -0.01 1.05 0.39 0.50 0.41 0.50 
  (0.18)  (0.30)***  (0.15)** (0.19)** (0.16)** (0.19)** 
English  0.55 0.10 0.19 -2.39 0.15 -2.80 
  (0.39) (0.31) (0.35) (2.28) (0.39) (2.56) 
French  0.23    0.06 -2.65 0.11 -3.01 
  (0.30)    (0.35) (2.17) (0.35) (2.42) 
German  0.65    0.67 -0.76 0.70 -0.89 
  (0.34)*    (0.29)** (2.43) (0.30)** (2.60) 
Private  Credit65*Income65      1.29    1.35 
      (0.48)***    (0.49)*** 
School65*Income65      -0.24    -0.23 
      (0.10)**    (0.10)** 
English*Income65      1.79    2.06 
      (1.32)    (1.49) 
German*Income65      0.60    0.70 
      (1.50)    (1.60) 
French*Income65      1.71    1.97 
      (1.35)    (1.50) 
Sample  OECD  non-OECD  full full full full 
Observations  22 35 57 57 57 57 
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV 
R-squared  0.55 0.33 0.28 0.41         
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
FinDev is the log growth rate of the private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of 
GDP, 1965-1995; Trade65 is the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP in 1965. Income65 is the log of real 
per capita GDP in 1965; PrivateCredit65 is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as 
share of GDP in 1965; School65 is the average years of schooling in the population over 25. English, German, and 
French indicate legal origin dummies. In Columns (5) and (6) the instrument for trade openness is the predicted 
openness obtained by Frankel and Romer (1999), and the instrument for Trade65*Income65 variable is the 
interaction of the Frankel and Romer instrument and Income65. All variables have been demeaned.   28
Table 4: Regression Results, Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable: FinDev             
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Trade65  0.61 0.43 0.46 0.35 
  (0.49) (0.41) (0.44) (0.45) 
Trade65*Income65  0.56 0.54 0.56 0.62 
  (0.33)*  (0.24)** (0.26)** (0.26)** 
PrivateCredit65  -2.19 -2.13 -2.07 -1.70 
  (0.80)***  (0.79)** (0.78)** (0.70)** 
Income65  -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
  (0.18) (0.22) (0.17) (0.20) 
School65  0.49 0.48 0.50 0.56 
 (0.21)**  (0.21)**  (0.22)**  (0.20)*** 
English  -2.61 -3.11 -3.50 -2.70 
  (2.53) (2.75) (3.06) (2.57) 
French  -2.85 -3.37 -3.75 -2.98 
  (2.40) (2.61) (2.90) (2.51) 
German  -0.66 -1.00 -1.74 -1.49 
  (2.62) (2.43) (3.68) (2.74) 
Private  Credit65*Income65  1.40 1.65 1.70 0.95 
 (0.52)**  (0.56)***  (0.55)***  (0.45)** 
School65*Income65  0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 
 (0.10)**  (0.11)**  (0.12)*  (0.14) 
English*Income65  1.97 2.38 2.63 1.91 
  (1.48) (1.63) (1.82) (1.48) 
German*Income65  0.55 0.65 1.20 1.10 
  (1.62) (1.53) (2.39) (1.70) 
French*Income65  1.87 2.25 2.50 1.96 
  (1.49) (1.64) (1.84) (1.57) 
Sample  Excl. 2 most open 
countries  
Excl. 2 least open 
countries  
Excl. 2 richest 
countries  
Excl. 3 poorest 
countries  
Observations  55 55 55 54 
Estimation  IV IV IV IV 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
FinDev is the log growth rate of the private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of 
GDP, 1965-1995; Trade65 is the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP in 1965. Income65 is the log of real 
per capita GDP in 1965; PrivateCredit65 is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as 
share of GDP in 1965; School65 is the average years of schooling in the population over 25. English, German, and 
French indicate legal origin dummies. The instrument for trade openness is the predicted openness obtained by 
Frankel and Romer (1999), and the instrument for Trade65*Income65 variable is the interaction of the Frankel and 
Romer instrument and Income65.  All variables have been demeaned.   29
Table 5: Regression Results, Alternative Measures of Financial Development 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable  M2/GDP  Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP 
      
Trade65  0.57 0.71 0.39 0.37 
 (0.28)**  (0.35)**  (0.37)  (0.45) 
Trade65*Income65  0.33 0.50 0.57 0.47 
  (0.18)* (0.22)**  (0.25)** (0.27)* 
Income65  -0.03 -0.21 0.12 -0.07 
  (0.08) (0.10)** (0.10)  (0.14) 
School65  0.20 0.20 0.26 0.49 
  (0.10)*  (0.10)** (0.17) (0.20)** 
English  0.11 -3.35 0.29 -4.03 
  (0.26) (1.49)** (0.34) (1.70)** 
French  0.17 -3.33 0.36 -3.95 
  (0.22) (1.33)** (0.31) (1.55)** 
German  0.75 -1.56 0.96 -3.21 
  (0.26)*** (1.45) (0.31)*** (2.07) 
M2/GDP65 -0.93  -1.03     
 (0.33)***  (0.42)**     
M2/GDP65*Income65  0.50    
   (0.25)*    
BankAssets65     -1.47  -2.06 
     (0.38)***  (0.69)*** 
BankAssets65*Income65      0.78 
      (0.60) 
School65*Income65   -0.01  -0.16 
   (0.07)  (0.10) 
English*Income65   2.14  2.55 
   (0.82)**   (0.94)*** 
German*Income65   1.23  2.27 
   (0.93)  (1.40) 
French*Income65   2.12  2.67 
   (0.90)**   (0.94)*** 
Observations  57 57 57 57 
Estimation  IV IV IV IV 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
dependent variable is the log growth rate, 1965-1995; Trade65 is the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP 
in 1965. Income65 is the log of real per capita GDP in 1965; M2/GDP65 is liquid liabilities as share of GDP in 
1965; BankAssets65 is claims of deposit money banks on nonfinancial domestic sectors as share of GDP in 1965; 
School65 is the average years of schooling in the population over 25. English, German, and French indicate legal 
origin dummies. The instrument for trade openness is the predicted openness obtained by Frankel and Romer 
(1999), and the instrument for Trade65*Income65 variable is the interaction of the Frankel and Romer instrument 
and Income65. All variables have been demeaned.   30
Table 6: Panel Regression Results 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable  Change in Private 
Credit/GDP  Change in M2/GDP Change Bank 
Assets/GDP 
Change in Private 
Credit/GDP 
      
Trade  -2.04 -1.00 -1.12 -2.01 
  (0.85)**  (0.49)** (0.73) (0.87)** 
Trade*Income  0.32 0.16 0.18 0.31 
  (0.13)**  (0.07)** (0.11)* (0.13)** 
Income -0.25  0.02  -0.04  -0.21 
  (0.14)*  (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) 
School  -0.40 -0.24 -0.55 -0.33 
  (0.39)  (0.22) (0.31)* (0.42) 
School*Income  0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
PrivateCredit -5.70      -5.49 
 (1.27)***      (1.30)*** 
PrivateCredit*Income 0.52      0.50 
 (0.15)***      (0.15)*** 
M2/GDP   -2.62     
   (0.72)***     
(M2/GDP)*Income   0.21    
   (0.09)**     
BankAssets     -4.89  
     (1.02)***  
BankAssets*Income     0.44  
     (0.12)***  
Observations  347 348 347 347 
Number of countries  77  77  77  77 
Time Effects  no  no  no  yes 
R-squared  0.22 0.27 0.27 0.23 
Notes: Fixed effects estimates; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent 
variable is the log growth rate of a financial development indicator over the previous period; Trade is the sum of 
imports and exports as a share of GDP. Income is the log of real per capita GDP; PrivateCredit is private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP; M2/GDP is liquid liabilities as share of GDP; 
BankAssets is claims of deposit money banks on nonfinancial domestic sectors as share of GDP; School is the 
average years of schooling in the population over 25. 